Could NATO defend itself without America?

In the early 1960s, erstwhile French president , Charles De Gaulle, said that the US would never ‘sacrifice New York for Paris’. During that time, only the US and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, and there were growing concerns about how committed the United States was to protecting France and the rest of its European allies. 

This fear led to a strong desire for autonomy - especially when it came to nuclear weapons - and eventually led to France developing its atomic bomb. 

60 years later, a feeling of deja vu is spreading across Europe once again. The US has long bemoaned the lack of defence spending from its European allies and having to shoulder a disproportionate amount of the burden for NATO. They are not entirely wrong. As of 2024, the US’s annual defence budget was  $461 billion more than the rest of NATO combined. With the re-introduction of Donald Trump’s ultra-nationalist ideology in the White House, that tolerance for bearing an outsized share of NATO defence costs may be wearing very thin. There are already signs that patience has cracked. Trump’s heated argument with Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in the Oval Office followed by the abrupt halt in all US military aid to Ukraine “felt like a deeper rupture, not just with Ukraine, but with the entire US ‘free world’ strategy” Dan Fried, a former US assistant Secretary of State for Europe, said.

The breakdown of NATO’s structural integrity could not have come at a worse time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine serves as a painful but necessary reminder to NATO countries that Russia is still a very viable threat. And that threat still stands at large. Despite the loss of more than 1 million troops according to the British Ministry of Defence, “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within 5 years,” reports the NATO secretary-general. It is evident that the sheer scale of its manpower and the vast military resources it possesses arguably surpasses any country in the world(perhaps but for the US). Moreover, Russian forces will have a wealth of battlefield experience that would be invaluable in a war, making them a far more capable war machine than the one currently in Ukraine - a highly dangerous proposition for NATO.

All of this begs the question: Could NATO defend itself against Russia if the US decides to leave? If the US were to leave NATO, estimates suggest that NATO would need a €250 billion increase in annual defence spending. 5 years ago, that would have been seen as needless and too high a price to pay. Although as a result of the war in Ukraine, “for the first time in the history of the EU, everyone realises there is a common threat and a common need to re-arm,” says Clement Beaune, a former European minister. And at the recent NATO meeting in The Hague, a commitment of 3.5% of GDP spending on defence and 1.5% on ‘defence-related investments’ was agreed. It is a promising first step.  Nonetheless, there are some glaring pitfalls with the spending target. The 3.5% benchmark has a target date of 2035 due to countries such as Spain, which still spends only about 1.3% of GDP on defence, delaying it. As blatantly pointed out by the Lithuanian defence minister, “2035 is after the [next] war”; With Russia potentially being ready to attack by 2030, it is crucial that the increased defence spending comes sooner. More importantly, there should not be a repeat of the 2014 NATO 2% spending target, in which only 6 members out of 32 achieved it by 2021. Such a scenario could have cataclysmic consequences for European security.

Getting the funds is the first step. However, for NATO to be truly self-sufficient, the way it uses the funds will be equally important. An area that would require significant investment is command and control structures. Since NATO’s inception, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe - who runs all military operations of NATO - and other key leadership positions have almost always been occupied by US generals. Former US Major General Skip Davis claims it “would be extremely difficult” for NATO to function without any US commanders. Furthermore, NATO assessments suggest Europe would also face a severe loss of key ‘enablers’ such as military communication channels, intelligence gathering, and long-range precision strike abilities. Without these, NATO’s ability to function as a military force would be heavily diminished and uncoordinated; though replacing them is an acute, time-consuming, and expensive undertaking. Hence, directing a significant portion of the funds into re-establishing a structured leadership and these critical ‘strategic enablers’ would be a wise and sensible move.

Europe’s dependency on the US does not end there. European NATO countries still import over 60% of all their arms purchases from the US. Additionally, while Europe was unable to deliver a million artillery shells to Ukraine by Spring 2024, Russia is still producing over 3 million artillery shells annually on top of a total 12 million shells from North Korea since the start of the war as well. It all points to a glaring gap in NATO’s ability to produce enough weaponry and equipment to sustain a war by itself without a large reliance on the US. While arms shipments from the US to Europe are likely to continue given the commercial interests of US defence companies, it is still a large risk considering the unpredictability of the American government - especially in strategic industries like defence. 

For a European NATO to be more independent, it would require Europe - especially the major powers like France, Germany, and the UK - to build large-scale military production capabilities and reduce dependency on other nations by importing from each other instead. Fortunately, progress is already being made. At the recent NATO summit, the Defence Production Action Plan was updated: It provides a framework for increased intra-European arms transfers and the development of defence industries. Furthermore, numerous European defence firms like BAE Systems and Rheinmetall are already opening new production facilities and increasing munitions production. By 2026, Europe could reach an annual production of 2.4 million artillery shells , an eightfold increase since 2022. “Europe alone (still has) a capacity to muster the resources it would need to defend itself, it’s just a question of whether it is willing to,” Ben Schreer, an executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, suggested.

What about nuclear weapons? The US provides the bulk of NATO’s nuclear deterrent with over 5,000 nuclear warheads. In contrast, the UK and France, the only other nuclear powers in NATO, possess just over 500 nuclear weapons. That number is very small when compared to Russia’s 5459-strong nuclear arsenal. France and the UK could technically increase their nuclear arsenals to create a better deterrent. Having said that, the cost of developing new nuclear weapons would be extremely expensive - even more so given that France has already disbanded fissile production facilities needed to develop nuclear weapons. Coupled with the alarmingly pressing needs in other facets, such as command and control, the cost-benefit ratio of adding more nuclear weapons does not justify itself. Instead, the NATO nuclear umbrella should rely on the belief that the damage 500 nuclear weapons could inflict on Russia is not worth nuclear war or potentially even conventional war against NATO for Mr Putin.

Replacing the US in NATO would be a steep and daunting task. Nevertheless, if the determination is there and the correct logical steps are taken towards achieving a more independent European defence, “the withdrawal of US forces may create an even stronger, not weaker, Europe,” wrote Moritz Graefrath of William and Mary’s global research institute. But if Europe falls into the trap of looking the other way again, the Russian bear will be prowling on the doorstep of NATO, and this time the US may not be there - or willing - to save the day.